NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 57 | Number 2

Article 11

2-1-1979

Tort Law -- Norton v. United States: Federal
Government's Liability Coterminous with That of
Its Agents Under Federal Tort Claims Act
Amendment
Donald A. Kirkman

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Donald A. Kirkman, Tort Law -- Norton v. United States: Federal Government's Liability Coterminous with That of Its Agents Under Federal
Tort Claims Act Amendment, 57 N.C. L. Rev. 350 (1979).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol57/iss2/11

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

350

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[o5
[Vol. 57

practical results of the decision will not, of course, be apparent for
some time, given the enormous problems in implementing the complicated orders issued in right-to-habilitation decisions.8" Pennhurst's importance, however, lies in its potentially broad application in future
litigation more than in its results for the particular institution. First,
and least controversially, Pennhurstis another in a growing number of
cases recognizing the institutionalized retardates' right to habilitation.
Second, it provides authority for a new means of achieving habilitation-complete closure of the institution and substitution of community care facilities-based upon judicial recognition of changes in
medical theory about what constitutes minimally adequate habilitation
for the retarded. Pennhurst will undoubtedly be a potent and oftenused weapon for the institutionalized retarded; however, because it is
not a precisely formulated decision, it may not be a weapon easy to
wield. And finally, Pennhurst at least begins a redefinition of the circumstances giving rise to the right to habilitation. Such a redefinition
is necessary to establish the applicability and scope of the right to habilitation in the noninstitutional contexts that will be created by the
condemnation of institutions and the consequent widespread establishment of community facilities. Because Pennhurst serves not only as a
blueprint for future litigation but as a warning about the constitutionality of future provision of facilities for the mentally retarded, its influence ought to be far-reaching.
NANCY M. P. KING

Tort Law-Norton v. United States: Federal Government's
Liability Coterminous with That of Its Agents Under
Federal Tort Claims Act Amendment
Prior to the 1970's a United States citizen had no remedy against
the United States Government or individual federal law enforcement
classification requiring heightened judicial scrutiny, see, e.g., Mason & Menolascino, supra note 1,

at 160-64; this intermediate scrutiny in equal protection cases is not yet an established test.
82. See, ag., Note, The Wyatt Case:Implementation ofa JudicialDecree OrderingInstitutional

Change, 84 YALE L.J. 1338 (1975). Most of the important cases are all still struggling with implementation and challenge of their courts' orders. See generally MENTAL RETARDATION AND THE
LAW: A REPORT ON STATUS OF CURRENT COURT CAsEs, supra note 18; cases cited note 59 supra.
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agents for the "constitutional torts"1 of these agents. In 1971, however,
in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics,2 the United States Supreme Court held that a cause of action existed against individual federal officers for fourth amendment
violations;3 on remand the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit determined that the agent would be liable when he had not
acted in good faith and with a reasonable belief that his actions were
lawful.4 Moreover, in 1974 Congress amended the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA),5 which had limited the United States' waiver of sovereign
immunity to the negligent torts of federal employees,6 to make the federal government independently liable for many intentional torts committed by its law enforcement agents. 7 In Norton v. UnitedStates' the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was faced with
the question whether the United States was able to assert the good faith
and reasonable belief of its agents, a defense that the agents could individually claim, as a defense in a lawsuit against the Government for a
fourth amendment violation committed by federal agents. Reversing
the trial court, the court held that the Government could use as a defense to the action the good faith and reasonable belief of its agents. 9
On March 15, 1975, the Alexandria, Virginia police received an
anonymous tip that Patricia Hearst, a nationally-sought fugitive, was
1. "Constitutional torts" are tortious acts that violate an individual's constitutional rights.
The most typical infringements by government agents involve fourth or fifth amendment rights.
2. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
3. Id. at 397.
4. 456 F.2d 1339, 1341 (2d Cir. 1972). Recently, in Butz v. Economou, 98 S. Ct. 2894 (1978),
the Supreme Court acknowledged that under Bivens federal officers were not entitled to an absolute or unqualified immunity for their actions.
5. Act of Mar. 16, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-253, § 2, 88 Stat. 50 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)
(Supp. V 1975)). Through this Act the United States became liable only for the negligent acts or
omissions of federal employees; the Act did not make the government liable for any intentional
torts committed by its agents.
6. Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, § 421, 60 Stat. 812 (1946).
7. The amendment explicitly makes the federal government liable for some types of offenses
that were exempt under the original Act. The language of the amendment reads as follows:
Provided That, with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States Government, the provisions of this chapter and section
1346(b) of this title shall apply to any claim arising, on or after the date of the enactment
of this proviso, out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process,
or malicious prosecution. For the purpose of this subsection, "investigative or law enforcement officer" means any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to
execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (Supp. V 1975).
8. 581 F.2d 390 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3383 (U.S. Dec. 5, 1978) (No. 78461).
9. Id. at 397.
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hiding in an Alexandria apartment. Acting on this tip, several FBI
agents, in conjunction with local officers, went to plaintiff's apartment
without seeking or obtaining a search warrant.' 0 Plaintiff Norton was
residing alone in the apartment at that time.I The agents knocked on
the door and orally identified themselves, whereupon plaintiff informed
them that she would call their office to verify their identities. 2 As she
attempted to call for verification, the officers began to strike the door in
an attempt to open it forcibly. Fearing her door would be destroyed,
Norton removed the catch and the agents entered with weapons
drawn. 1 3 After an exhaustive search of plaintiffs apartment uncovered
no evidence of Hearst, the agents realized their tip had been
4
inaccurate.'
Plaintiff instituted an action against the local agents based on 42
U.S.C. § 198315 and against the federal officers directly under the
fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 6 In addition, she filed suit against the United States under the FTCA, as
amended.' 7 Both the local and federal officers defended their actions
on the ground that they acted in good faith and with reasonable belief
that their actions were lawful.' 8 The United States also defended on
the ground that its agents had acted in good faith and with a reasonable
belief in the lawfulness of their actions.' 9 On cross-motions for sum10. Norton v. Turner, 427 F. Supp. 138, 142 (E.D. Va. 1977), rev'd, 581 F.2d 390 (4th Cir.
1978).
11. Local police, using telephone locator crisscrosses, thought the apartment was occupied by

a man whom they had investigated for carrying a concealed weapon. That person, however, had
vacated the apartment over five months earlier, at which time plaintiff had moved in. Id. at 14142.
12. The details of this interchange were disputed, but both parties agreed that at no time did
Norton view the credentials of the officers. Id. at 142.

13. Id.
14. Id.

15. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to

the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.

16. 581 F.2d at 392.
17. The specific provisions on which she based her suit were 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674,
2680(h) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 427 F. Supp. 138, 140 (E.D. Va. 1977), rev'd, 581 F.2d 390 (4th

Cir. 1978). Section 1346(b) is the basic jurisdictional statute for federal tort claims, § 2674 sets
forth the scope of federal liability under the FTCA, and § 2680(h) eliminated the exclusion of

Government liability for the intentional torts of its employees. The text of § 2680(h) appears in
note 7 supra.
18. 581 F.2dat 392.

19. Id.
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mary judgment tile district court determined that the actions of the law
enforcement officers violated plaintiff's fourth amendment rights because the officers had no probable cause to believe that Hearst was
present.2 0 The court concluded, however, that because further factfinding was necessary with regard to the good faith and reasonable belief defense of the agents, summary judgment against the individual
agents was inappropriate. 2 1 The court entered summary judgment
against the United States, however, on the ground that the United
States could not, as a matter of law, assert the good faith defense of its
agents in an action brought under the FTCA. 22 Subsequently, the suit
against the individual local and federal officers was dismissed and
judgment was entered against the United States.3
On appeal the Government did not contest the district court's findthat
a fourth amendment violation had occurred,24 nor did it dising
pute the application of the FTCA and 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) 21 to the
action.26 The sole issue on appeal was whether the Government could
raise in defense the good faith and reasonable belief of its agents. 27
Relying exclusively on the legislative history of the amendment to section 2680(h), 28 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the trial court and held that because there was no clear
statement of a legislative policy to expand the Government's vicarious
liability beyond the scope of the agent's direct liability, the court should
not impose liability on the federal government when its agents have
acted in good faith with a reasonable belief in the legality of their
actions. 29
Tort actions have been available against state officials who violate
the constitutional rights of citizens since Congress passed section
1983.30 Recently this liability has been extended to suits against municipalities. 31 The liability of the United States and its individual agents
20. 427 F. Supp. 138, 144 (E.D. Va. 1977), rev'd,581 F.2d 390 (4th Cir. 1978).
21. Id. at 146.
22. Id. at 152.
23. See 581 F.2d at 392.
24. Id.
25. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (Supp. V 1975).
26. 581 F.2d at 392.
27. Id. at 393.
28. Id. at 395 n.7.
29. Id. at 397.
30. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970),
quotedin note 15 supra). For examples of actions brought under this statute, see Sorenson, QuasiJudicialImmunity: Its Scope and Limitations in Section 1983 Actions, 1976 DUKE L.J. 95.
31. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978).
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for violation of constitutional rights has also been a recent development. The liability of individual federal agents arose out of Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of FederalBureau of Narcotics, in which
the Supreme Court held a cause of action to exist against federal law
32
enforcement officers who violate citizens' fourth amendment rights.
Under Bivens victims of this constitutional tort are entitled to recover
money damages against individual federal agents for injuries suffered
as a result of the agent's violation of the amendment.33 On remand the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the
individual officer could escape liability by showing that he had a good
faith and reasonable belief that his actions were legal under the circumstances. 34 Without this defense law enforcement agents would be inhibited in performing their discretionary duties by the possibility of
civil lawsuits.3
Originally the FTCA waived sovereign immunity36 only for the
negligent torts of federal employees; the Government retained its immunity for intentional torts committed by its law enforcement agents.
Realizing that judgments against individual officers would often produce no recovery, Congress amended the FTCA in 1974, making the
United States liable for the intentional torts of its agents. The language
of the amendment does not specifically delineate the scope of the Government's liability, however. The court in Norton, interpreting the statute, held that "the liability of the United States under section 2680(h) is
coterminous with the liability of its agents under Bivens, ' '37 and there32. 403 U.S. at 389.
33. Id. at 397.
34. 456 F.2d 1339, 1341 (2d Cir. 1972). The court explained that this defense consisted of two
distinct parts: first, a subjective good faith belief in the legality of the officer's actions; and second,
an objective standard of the reasonableness of that belief under all of the circumstances. Id. at
1348.
35. Many cases and commentators have pointed out the necessity of freeing law enforcement
officers from pressures of civil lawsuits.
We are called upon in this case to weigh in a particular context two considerations of
high importance which now and again come into sharp conflict-on the one hand, the
protection of the individual citizen against pecuniary damage caused by oppressive or
malicious action on the part of officials of the Federal Government; and on the other, the
protection of the public interest by shielding responsible governmental officers against
the harassment and inevitable hazards of vindictive or ill-founded damage suits brought
on account of action taken in the exercise of their official responsibilities.
Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 564-65 (1959). See also Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974);
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMEs, THE LAW OF Tonis § 29.14 (1956).

36. For a general treatment of the development of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, see
Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Inmunity, 77 HARv. L. Rav. 1 (1963);
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
37. 581 F.2d at 393.
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fore permitted the Government to retain immunity when its agents acted in good faith and with a reasonable belief.
The court rejected the arguments presented by both plaintiff and
defendant at the trial court level."8 Two other approaches were available to the court, however. Because the original FTCA made the Government liable for negligence "under circumstances where the United
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred,"3 9
the courts have traditionally looked to a particular state's doctrine of
respondeatsuperiorin determining the liability of the United States in
FTCA cases. 4° In Norton, however, the court rejected this traditional
state law negligence approach to FTCA cases because constitutional
torts based on the fourth amendment were essentially questions of federal law. 41 Finding the issue of federal liability under the amendment
sui generis,42 the court resolved to rely upon the intent of Congress in
enacting the amendment to ascertain the extent of the waiver of sovereign immunity.43
The specific language considered by the court to be controlling appears in a Senate Report that accompanied the amendment to section
38. The court explicitly rejected the policy arguments relied upon by the lower court to hold
the good faith and reasonable belief defense unavailable. The district court distinguished the
justification for qualified individual immunity from that of sovereign immunity. The former is
based on protecting a public servant from fear of civil lawsuit while performing his official duties,
while the latter was transplanted from a feudalistic system based on the divine right of kings,
suggesting that the rationale for sovereign immunity may no longer be applicable to tortious acts
by federal agents. 427 F. Supp. 138, 150-52 (E.D. Va. 1977), rev'd, 581 F.2d 390 (4th Cir. 1978).
The appellate court also refused to accept the arguments presented by the Government. 581 F.2d
at 395 n.8. The Government argued three alternative defenses. First, they argued that no tort was
committed at all because the agents did not act in bad faith or with an unreasonable belief. Second, they suggested that imposing liability without regard to the motives of the individual agents
was tantamount to imposing absolute liability on the Government, which contravened two decisions of the Supreme Court. See Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972); Dalehite v. United States,
346 U.S. 15 (1953). Finally, the Government argued that the good faith and reasonable belief
defense constituted a privilege rather than an immunity, thereby making the defense available to
the principal under the respondeat superiordoctrine. For a discussion of the respondeatsuperior

doctrine see note 40 and text accompanying notes 39-41 infra.
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970).
40. Under a respondeal superiortheory "both the precipitating tort and the scope of the government's vicarious liability were to be governed by 'the law of the [state] where the act or omission occurred."' 581 F.2d at 394 (citing Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 801 (1972)). See, e.g.,
James v. United States, 467 F.2d 832, 833 (4th Cir. 1972); Yates v. United States, 365 F.2d 663,
667 (4th Cir. 1966); Jennings v. United States, 291 F.2d 880 (4th Cir. 1961).
41. 581 F.2d at 394-95.
42. Id. at 395 n.8.
43. Id. at 394-95.
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2680(h).44 The passage stated:
[T]his provision should be viewed as a counterpart to the Bivens case
and its progenty [sic], in that it waives the defense of sovereign immunity so as to make the Government independently liable in damages for the same type of conduct that is alleged to have occurred in
Bivens (and for which that case imposes liability upon the individual
Government officials involved).45
The court emphasized the parenthetical phrase and interpreted this
passage to be evidence of congressional intent to impose liability on the
Government only when liability is imposed on the individual defendants in constitutional tort cases like Bivens.4 6

It seems, however, that the court did not give adequate weight to
the evidence from the legislative history that the intent of Congress in
submitting the legislation was indeed to expand the liability of the
United States in the Bivens-type case beyond the liability of the individual defendant. First, the language of the amendment itself suggested no limitation based on the individual liability of the agent. 47
Taken literally, therefore, this waiver of immunity is intended to cover
all of the specified intentional torts of federal law enforcement officers
irrespective of their defenses.48
Moreover, there is ample evidence in the legislative record to support an argument that the liability of the United States should be
broader than the liability of the individual officer under Bivens. Senate
Report Number 93-588, 49 on which the majority in Norton relied,
stated that "the Committee amendment would submit the Government
to liability whenever its agents act under color of law so as to injure the
public through search and seizures that are conducted without warrants
or with warrants issued without probable cause."50 This passage makes
no reference to a defense of good faith and reasonable belief, and
clearly applies to the fact situation in Norton. Yet the court in Norton
attributed this language to "imprecise draftsmanship"'" and disregarded it.
There is other evidence in the legislative record that supports the
44. S. REP. No. 93-588, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
Naws 2789.
45. Id. at 3, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2789, 2791.

46. 581 F.2d at 395.
47. See note 7 supra.
48. 581 F.2d at 398 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
49. S. REP. No. 93-588, supra note 44.
50. Id. at 4, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2789, 2791.
51. 581 F.2d at 396 n.12.
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conclusion that Congress intended to expand the liability of the United
States beyond the liability of the individual officers under Bivens. Senator Percy, in his remarks to the committee as sponsor of the amendment, recognized that the Bivens remedy alone was inadequate because

it "is severely limited by the ease with which agents can usually establish the defense of having acted in good faith and with probable

cause." 52 Clearly implied in his statement was his intent to impose liability on the Government, even when the individual agent can success-

fully raise the defense of good faith and reasonable belief.53 Although
the majority in Norton recognized that this evidence was contrary to
their holding, they regarded it as insignificant. 54 The court also over-

looked evidence in the record that states explicitly that it was not the
intent of the Senate committee that sponsored the legislation to allow
the United States to assert the good faith and reasonable belief defense

available to the individual defendants under Bivens. In a memorandum written by the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 5 in
which the amendment originated, the committee observed:
It is not the intention of this amendment to allow any other defenses
that may be available to individual defendants by state or federal
law, custom or practice to be asserted against the government. Congress does not oppose, however, the assertion of defenses of good
faith and reasonable belief in the validity of the search and arrest on
behalf of individual government defendants, so long as it is understood that the government's56 liability is not co-terminous with that of
the individual defendants.

52. S.REP. No. 93-469, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1973).
53. Id. at 37.

54. 581 F.2d at 396.
55. Senate Comm. on Government Operations, Memorandum on "No-Knock" Legislation
(Aug. 28, 1973) (copy on file in office of North CarolinaLaw Review). This memorandum is
discussed in Boger, Gitenstein & Verkuil, The FederalTort Claims Act IntentionalTorts Amendment: An InterpretiveAnalysis, 54 N.C.L. REv. 497, 514-15 (1976).

56. Senate Comm. on Government Operations, supra note 55, at 5. Based on this memorandum Boger, Gitenstein & Verkuil, supra note 55, concluded:
On one point, however, the Senate committees were clearly insistent on distinguishing their recommendation from prior law. The federal government was not to be allowed to escape liability under the new statute by retreating behind various "defenses"
that had been created under Bivens or section 1983 .... Thus, despite the constant

reference in legislative documents to Bivens and section 1983, the proposed federal liability was meant to differ in this very crucial aspect from its historical analogues.
Id. at 515. The court of appeals in Norton was not persuaded by this evidence, however. The
court pointed out that the district court was unable to secure a copy of this memorandum, and
further found it inexplicable that the Senate Committee in its report made no mention of this
memorandum. 581 F.2d at 396 n.1 1. On the contrary, the record indicates a strong reliance on the
memorandum on the part of the Senate Committee on Government Operations. The memorandum preceded, by three months, the publication of Senate Report 93-588 and most of the language appearing in the report is taken verbatim from the memorandum. Most important, the
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Moreover, the policy behind allowing the individual employee to
assert the good faith and reasonable belief defense is to protect him
from lawsuits for money damages arising out of the performance of
discretionary duties.- 7 Therefore, the good faith and reasonable belief
defense is available to the individual agent only in suits for money
damages." The "good faith defense in a suit for damages brought
against any federal official.

. .

is not assertable in the face of a request

limited to injunctive, declaratory, or mandamus relief,"5 9 reflecting that
the belief of the agent regarding the legality of the act does not mitigate
its tortious character. Thus, the policy underlying the availability of
the defense is inapplicable to the Government.
Norton is not the only case that has faced the issue whether the
Government can assert the good faith and reasonable belief of its
agents. Downs v. UnitedSates,6° a federal district court case, noted the
distinction in the underlying policies in declaring that the Government
is not entitled to assert the individual defenses of its agents in FTCA
actions.6 In recognizing that the origins of qualified individual and
sovereign immunity are distinct, the court concluded that
the application of immunity sought by the Government would
largely emasculate the purposes of the Tort Claims Act; it would be
inconsistent with the Act's waiver of immunity for the Government
to reclaim immunity merely because no action could be brought
against the employee whose act of omission gave rise to a damage
claim.6 2

As pointed out by a number of cases and commentators, it is indeed
logical that because the rationales for qualified individual immunity
and sovereign immunity are discrete, the two immunities need not aclanguage, set forth in text accompanying note 45 supra, that the court interpreted as evidence of an
intent to limit the liability of the United States under the amendment, originally appeared in the
memorandum. The Senate committee, then, placed great weight on the language in the memorandum, contrary to the conclusion of the appellate court in Norton. Although the specific language
that referred to Congress' explicit intention to disallow the Bivens defense by the Government is
omitted from Senate Report 93-588, it should not be concluded that it was purposefully omitted.
There is certainly sufficient evidence in the report to suggest that the Committee intended to provide a remedy for citizens who were victims of law enforcement abuses, regardless of the defense
of the individual agent.
57. Norton v. Turner, 427 F. Supp. 138, 146 (E.D. Va. 1977), res'd, 581 F.2d 390 (4th Cir.
1978).
58. id.
59. National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 609 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
accord,Timmerman v. Brown, 528 F.2d 811, 814 (4th Cir. 1975).
60. 382 F. Supp. 713 (M.D. Tenn. 1974), rev'don otherground&, 522 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1975).
61. Id. at 750.
62. Id.
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company one another.63 On the one hand law enforcement officers
should not have to perform their duties with a perpetual fear of civil
lawsuit; on the other, the victims of fourth amendment violations
should not be totally denied compensation when the Government explicitly admits the constitutional violation. Making the Government
liable even when the agent has a successful defense guarantees compensation for the victim while allowing law enforcement officers to perform free of the pressure of civil suit.
The clear intent of Congress in passing the FTCA amendment was
to provide compensation to the innocent victims of unconstitutional
law enforcement activities regardless of the defense of the original
agent.64 Contrary to this intent, the Norton decision, by allowing the
Government to assert the good faith and reasonable belief defense of
its agents, will permit victims of constitutional torts to go without a
remedy when the agent has a successful good faith and reasonable belief defense. Norton has thus preserved the immunity of the United
States for many of the intentional torts committed by its agents, thereby
circumventing the effectiveness of the FTCA amendment. Furthermore, this decision unfortunately departed from the trend to expand
governmental liability in constitutional tort cases and elevates the immunity of the United States above the policy of providing compensation to injured individuals.
DONALD A.

KIRKmAN

63. See note 35 supra.
64. See generally Boger, Gitenstein & Verkuil, supra note 55, at 532. This compensatory

interest is represented in S. REP. No. 93-588, supra note 44, at 2-3, reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2789, 2790 (referring to Collinsville, Illinois raids), as well as in S. REP. No.
93-469, supra note 52, at 36.

